In October 2000 a hedge fund holding an unpaid debt claim won an enorm against the debtor, the Republic of Peru, through an opportunistic inte common pari passu clause by a Brussels court. This development was met from policy makers and practitioners that the court's decision (its novel int the pari passu clause) would lead to a dramatic increase in the risks of ho faced by sovereign debtors. Over the ensuing years, multiple reform s proposed including the revision of certain contractual terms, the filing o a key case, and the imposition of an international bankruptcy regime question, looking back, that this Article empirically investigates is whethe markets actually perceived a significant increase in risk at the time of Brussels court decision. Equally important is whether markets discriminat competing versions of the pari passu clause based on their relative r
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I. Introduction
This Article examines the market reaction to a series of legal events concerning the ents. passu was often n of equitable me effect, or any e [debt instruments] were intended to stand on the same level footing ssu are adopted as a se. Further, as if to indicate its great importance, a version of the pari passu clause often showed up on the cover page of the offering document and most of the time was one of the terms described in the "summary of key terms" section at the front of the offering document. See also Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 Rev. , 1134 Rev. & n.12 (2006 Chamber, September 26, 2000) . 3 The "favored" creditors at the time were the holders of Peru's Brady bonds. These were the creditors who had entered into a restructuring agreement with Peru and taken the Brady instruments in exchange for their old bonds. Only a handful of creditors did not enter the exchange. Elliott was holding some of the paper that was not submitted in that exchange. We are unaware of whether there were other creditors who also sovereign debt issuances and more generally in cross border transactions. See Lee C. Buch Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 Emory L. J. 869, 871 ( Pam, two practicing lawyers in the sovereign debt field,explain at the outset of their ar Here is a typical formulation of the pari passu clause in a modern cross-border credit i The Notes rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of payment with all other presen unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Issuer The Latin phrase pari passu means "in equal step" or just "equally." The phrase pari used in equity jurisprudence to express the ratable interest of parties in the dispositio assets. As explained by an English commentator in 1900:
There is no special virtue in the words "pari passu," "equally" would have the sa other words showing that th without preference or priority among themselves, but the words pari pa general term well recognized in the administration of assets in courts of equity. Id. (internal citations omitted). In our dataset of over 300 issuances, every offering document contained a pari passu clau its obligations, Peru settled with the holdouts for $55 million, a tidy profit in view of the fact that it had earlier purchased the bonds for approximately $11 million. The vast majority of sovereign debt is held by institutions and other lar investors around the world. The prior norm in the New York market had attempt. This potential veto inherently invites holdouts to engage in strateg successfully employed in Elliott. At the time, the U.S. government the holders in principal amount are required to modify the terms of a debt 10 A CAC is a covenant written into a bond contract that allows a pre-specified fraction of the firm's bondholders to alter the payment terms of the contract (principal, interest, and dates of payment); without a CAC, any change in the terms of the indenture agreement must be approved by all of the firm's bondholders. Thus, the effect of a CAC is to reduce the holdout problem associated with a unanimity rule and should therefore reduce the spread on sovereign debt. , 5-6, (Jan. 12, 2004) , in Macrotecnic, available at: http://www.emta.org/members/New_York_Fed_Amicus_Brief.pdf. (stating that the adoptio interpretation of the pari passu clause "would allow holdout creditors to disrupt the efficien payment and settlement systems, create legal uncertainty for those systems, and ultimately cau economic implications for beyond the sovereign debt dispute"). 16 As noted earlier, the New York Clearing House that represents the largest commercial b brief in the case, taking the same position as the U.S. government. See New York Clearin Curiae Brief filed in Macrotecnic, January 13, 2004 (available at http://www.emta.org/nd Elliott also sparked a flurry of concern at the IMF. The IMF focused on the implications of th court decision for the creditors of countries that default on their debt. The result of this co formal proposal to for an international bankruptcy court, which would among other things to reform contract terms and grant stays on litigation -similar to the stay associated with C U.S. The purpose, in light of Elliott, was to give defaulting countries the time to work out th an orderly fashion and, presumably, to insure that pari passu clauses and other provisio enforced. See Assuming that capital market agents incorporate the implications of im into the pricing of securities, we ask whether the market considered these significant. That is, did prices move accordingly? Specifically, we inquire whether the markets perceived a significant increase in the risk of holdout litigation subsequent to all CACs and non-CACs were identical. The problem though is that the CACs and nonCACs being examined in all of these studies likely had significant variation in phrasing 28 cific phrasing onds, we find ond pricing is sensitive to changes in legal risk posed by particular type bond covenants. Elliott, however, presents a unique natural experiment in which the co came as a shock to the market and was clearly unanticipated. The decis injunction was made ex parte on the basi 28 Id. Our study did not have to confront the problem of differing forms of CACs since the l CACs in our study were strikingly similar to one another with no material differences in thei 29 Rev. 141 (2002) . With respect to judicial decisions, Bhagat and Romano note that "judicial decisions are not clearly "events" except for the litigants . . . [because] other firms and investors will be able to contract around a rule and recalibrate costs and benefits". However, in the instant case, Elliott did not resolve any issue that firms could subsequently contract around. Rather the decision injected uncertainty in the pricing of sovereign debt. Further, as discussed later, the data show that the lawyers found themselves unable to contract around the decision. As an heightened need to settle -reportedly, a function of Alberto Fujimori's ten position and resultant desire to avoid the pu might have brought -was also likely unanticipated.
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We think that it is plausible to assume that the filing of the government kept secret until the last moment, but also because it was not clear w 33 Our interviews suggest that this legislation took months rather than years. Interviews with officials in Belgium for a sister project suggest that the Belgian legislature removed relative quickly, in contrast to many attempts at legislation that can take years, because of the importance of demonstrating to important institutions like Euroclear that Belgium was a friendly location for them and that Elliott was an aberration. See Scott & Gulati, supra note 31 (reporting on interviews with Belgian officials). 
Sample Description
Our sample consists of 312 bonds issued by 40 countries over the through 2007. This is the full set of sovereign bond offerings available from sample and extracted the relevant data by hand. Since the legal issues we e under U.S. law, we limit our inquiry to the population of U.S. law i e, the vast majority of all sovereign bonds are issued under either U.S German and Japanese law governed issuances comprise but slivers of the ma shelf-registrations offerings entail unique risks to investors. 36 The frequencies reported in Ta 34 U.S. law effectively means the law of the state of New York, since that is the state law th bonds in our sample chose.
at all of the ermits issuers to ments for public e security weeks and sometimes months in advance of their actual sale. Once the formal registration steps are complied with and the registration statement is effective, the issuer then places the securities "on the shelf" to await market events that allow it to reduce interest rates by discretely catching market windows. 36 Because speed is the essence of catching market windows, shelf offerings customarily entail competing bids from underwriters so that there is much less time for underwriters and their counsel to perform due diligence in connection with the offerings. In addition, there is the suspicion that shelf offerings signal the offered security is believed to be over-priced. The latter arises because the very purpose of the shelf that the sovereign bond market was thin prior to 1993. However, 13 new issues were brought to market in 1996 and the average number of new issues was slightly over 25 per yea to the period s were being ntly given is that, after the losses the banks suffered in the 1980s, their enthusiasm for sovereign lending diminished. The small number of outstanding bonds, however, had been largely The expansion in the sovereign bond market roughly corresponds when the restructurings of sovereign loans from the prior two decade concluded. 37 The rationale for the shift from loans to bonds that is freque immune from the restructurings of 1980s and early 1990s, which gave inves confidence in bonds that loans did not carry.
38
There was also the innovation of Brady bonds -that were collateralized using U.S.
banks with favorable accounting treatment -that may have helped add co was virtually zero until 2003. However, 70% of all issues in 2003 containe ility to act more jects investors in k of such opportunism. The two features mentioned, likely lower levels of diligence and likely opportunism by the issuer, may result in a market discout for shelf offerings. Cf. David J. Denis, Shelf Registration and the Market for Seasoned Equity Offerings, 64 J. Bus. 189, 190-195 (1991) (few for-profit issuers engage in equity shelf offerings because the offerings incur substantial discounts for fear shares will be sold only when management believes they are overpriced in the market offering is to facilitate the issuer catching favorable "market windows." It is the ab opportunistically in the shelf registration context than in other types of offerings that sub securities offered pursuant to a shelf registration to a somewhat heightened ris The results of the first regression ("R1") in Table 2 indicate that, as would be to the bond's S&P rating: the coefficients are monotonically related to ratings -the higher the rating the lower the spread; the coefficients are "centered" around the omitted rating (BBB);
The data reported in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 1 indicate that th sample observations are after 1998. The number of observation per year double after 1998, relative to the yearly rate prior to 1998. Thus, the s presented below are heavily weighted toward the 1999-2006 period. Table 2 reports the results of our regression analysis of the spread debt as a function of (1) the bond's rating; (2) the log of the size of the i maturit h the closest time to maturity. We define this difference as the bond's vector of bond spreads is the dependent variable in all of the regression Table 2 . The results of R(1) also indicate that spreads are negatively related the issue. This is a curious finding. If there were a downward sloping dem the bonds of a particular sovereignty, then one would expect a positive rel spreads and amount. The more debt that is issued, the lower the price ( which would reduce its spread. In addition, there may " phenomenon at play. The Official Sector, fearing contagion, may be step in to protect against defaults in the case of the largest issuers.
IV. Empirical Results
The data reveal that shelf-registered issues command a higher spr register a new issue, "put the registered bonds on the shelf," and issue the firm, here a country, believes it to be propitious to do so. One explanation the Finance literature is that market participants anticipate this incentive, a this adverse selection by price-protecting themselves against the a they will price the bonds lower (generating a higher spread) when the coun offerings -because of the speed with which these offerings are taken to the market -is lower than that for non-shelves and that the market is discounting shelf offerings for this The results of R(1) in Table 2 indicate that the presence of a CAC reduces the spread on sovereign debt. However, recall that prior to 2003
sovereign debt had such clauses, whereas after 2003 more than 90% did regre gnificantly different from zero when we add dummy variables for t years.
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Before moving on it is important to pause and note that it has bec consists of 312 bonds issued by 40 countries. Consequently, our sample number of bonds issued by the same country and clearly these are no observations. As we discuss below, countries are loathed to change even th the covenants in their debt instruments from on certainly country-related risks that are not captured by the issue's S&P rating. Ther 41 As demonstrated subsequently, after Elliott, there were more changes in the private offerings than in the shelf deals, which provide mild support for this conjecture. However, as we will see, there are so few changes overall, that one cannot make too much of these differences. 42 Since only 75% of the bonds issued in 2003 had CACs, as compared to over 90% thereafter, we test for the cross-sectional effect of CACs in that year. We find that there is no statistical relation between the presence of a CAC and bond spreads in that year. While the spreads are predictably and consistently related to ratings, the coefficient on the CAC dummy variable is positive and insignificant. The pattern of the coefficients on the dummy variables in R(4) across these seven years is consistent with the predictions of the holdout analysis. All of the dummy is to "cluster" the estimates of the standard errors by country, which covariance between the issues of a particular country through time. We R(2) in Table 2 includes 40 country dummy variables. The first th that the adjusted R 2 increases from 0.45 to 0.55 with the inclusion of B rated bonds are significant, even after controlling for country effects. Im inclusion of country fixed-effects does not affect the signs or the statistica of the other independent variables in the model -Amount, Shelf and CAC.
in Table 2 reports the effects of clustering standard errors at the country lev significance of the independent variables reported under R(1). Table 2 The categorization we use is drawn from the writings of the leading commentators on the topic. 45 The riskiest form of the clause provides "We will pay our debt obligations clauses' language provided the debt shall "rank at least pari passu in priority of payment urity." This is the language that was common before the Belgian court in E ks "rank" and t bonds could
R(4) in
The results of dividing the contracts in terms of their differential vulnerability to et reacted broadly to
Elliott; our three-way division of clauses allows discrete inquiry as to whether the on a pro rata basis". Either that or words such as "and shall be paid as such discharged as such" will appear at the end of the standard clause prov ranking of debt claims. Italy was among the sovereigns in our dataset usin
clause. Language such as this can hardly be interpreted other than com refers to ranking (such as, equal rights in any alternation of the bond's term act of payment, it poses a lower order of risk that the clause could be th substantial holdout claim. This form of the clause is widely used and appea for Belize and Guatemala, among others. Falling in between, in the middle and in rank of sec lliott and permitted Elliott's expert to successfully argue that the wor "pay" were interchangeable so that the natural construction should be tha only be paid rateably.
litigation enables us to go beyond the question of whether the mark market's reaction was dependent on the risk levels of the type of clause employed -a level of inquiry that has not previously been conducted with respect to bond contracts.
ped effect of vulnerability" n the spreads ote that these relations are significant while holding constant the bond's rating, and in R(4) and R (5) We see from R(1) in Table 3 Table 6 reports the distribution of the sample according S&P bond ratings. The data show that the distribution of the ratings of sovereign bonds has remained relatively sovereign issuer and its underwriters than the latter.
The overall story implied by the results reported in Table 5 is that there changes in language made at all -as a general matter, the clauses hardly cha number of changes made, if anything, dropped after Elliott, instead of conservative; in effect, they froze. As a are made in the private offerings than in the public shelf deals. But the d not big enough to make too much of them here.
As noted, we are puzzled as to why lawyers for sovereigns did not atte tively free of problems given the questionable role the clause would ev sovereigns do not liquidate) or employing language for pari passu claus problematic.
As a check on the robustness of our empirical tests, we examine 
Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that market prices adjust to unanticipated ju
We conjecture that the 2000 Belgian decision was a shock to the market new source of uncertainty into the pricing of these securities. We find emp decision, including in 2003, the year when CACs began to be adopted by th
We also find that spreads are significantly lower than the historical avera years following the filing of amicus briefs by the U.S. have been more a symptom of a change rather than the change itself. 48 Co possibility is that we find a significant spread-decreasing effect correspo moves taken by the Official Sector to counter specifically the ratea limited utility against the rateable payments interpretation .
The foregoing story challenges the dominant narrative in the s literature, which has been to link the holdout problem to the solution of evidence suggests that the holdout problem was linked more directly to t broader and more general holdout problem appears to have had little e within the time frame we examine here. It is possible that the utility of th 48 In the 2001-2003 period, Elliott was followed by assertions of the rateable paym three other cases, against the Congo, Nicaragua and Argentina. It was in the third of those case Argentina, that the U.S. government and the N.Y. Fed stepped in to give their views as Scott & Gulati, supra note 31. 49 In theory CACs could be used up front in a restructuring to protec ents interpretation in s, against, amicus curiae. See t against the holdout problem by simply obtaining the necessary voting threshold to reduce the amount owed by the debtor. However, if that threshold was not obtained (and a 75% vote is not easy to obtain, especially if the holdouts obtain a sizeable position), the rateable payments interpretation could come into play. 50 The foregoing is not altogether surprising, when one sees that CACs work only within a single bond issue. That is, a sovereign might have bonds with CACs and bonds requiring unanimous approval. In such a case, the CACs would help only to ameliorate the holdout problem with the bond that contained them. And to the extent the sovereign was not willing to treat the CAC bondholders differently than the others, the CACs would be useless (at least until the sovereign had retired all its non CAC bonds). The antilitigation strategies, by contrast, directly attacked the problem and potentially solved it. We conclude with a conundrum: if the ambiguities arising fro decision caused an increase in the cost of sovereign debt, then why were t modified, clarified, or simply removed from future offerings more widely 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
